INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are a noncitizen charged with a criminal offense. The prosecution presents a plea bargain: you plead guilty in exchange for a reduced prison sentence. Your case does not look promising, and the plea bargain seems like a great offer. But is there a catch? An overwhelming number of criminal offenses result in the deportation of noncitizens like you Would you want your lawyer to tell you if accepting the guilty plea would cause you to be deported? Almost certainly yes. But does your lawyer have a constitutional duty to do this?
Until a few years ago, the answer was probably not. However, in Padilla v. Kentucky, 1 the U.S. Supreme Court held that an attorney's failure to warn his client that pleading guilty to a criminal drug charge would result in his deportation constituted ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. 2 Recognizing the severity of a deportation consequence, the Court determined that Padilla's counsel failed to give him the constitutionally adequate assistance required under the Sixth Amendment's Counsel Clause. 3 This decision by the Padilla Court has the potential to effect a sea change in ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence.
The distinction between the direct and collateral consequences of a guilty plea runs throughout both state and federal jurisprudence. 4 Pursuant to the collateral consequences rule, attorneys are constitutionally required to warn their clients about direct consequences of a guilty plea, which typically relate to the nature of the criminal charge and sentencing. 5 By contrast, attorneys are not required to warn their clients about collateral consequences, which are usually noncriminal in nature. 6 Deportation, the consequence at issue in Padilla, was traditionally considered a collateral consequence of a guilty plea because it is a civil, not a criminal, consequence. 7 Therefore, prior to Padilla, counsel was not constitutionally required to advise a criminal defendant of the deportation consequences of a guilty plea in most jurisdictions. However, the Padilla Court created a categorical exception to the traditional rule: in order to provide effective assistance of counsel, attorneys must warn criminal defendants when a guilty plea could result in deportation. 8 To reach this conclusion, however, the Supreme Court refused to categorize deportation as either a direct or collateral consequence. Instead, the Court focused on several features of immigration law that render it "intimately related to the criminal process." 9 Lower courts have split regarding Padilla's impact on the collateral consequences rule. 10 Some courts, referred to in this Note as "no impact" courts, have held that Padilla is an outlier decision that has no impact on the traditional distinction between direct and collateral consequences. 11 These courts interpret Padilla's holding to be limited to deportation. 12 As a result, these no impact courts deny ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on counsel's failure to warn of consequences traditionally considered to be collateral. 13 However, other courts, referred to in this Note as "innovator" courts, have held that Padilla shifted the understanding of the direct and collateral consequences of a guilty plea for the purpose of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 14 Innovator courts have held that, after Padilla, some traditional collateral consequences must be considered direct under the existing collateral consequences rule. 15 This Note examines Padilla and the split it has caused in the lower courts where a defendant asserts an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based upon a traditional collateral consequence that stems automatically from a guilty plea, like deportation. 16 16. Courts have also considered Padilla's impact on the direct versus collateral distinction when evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based upon a and constitutional requirements for a valid guilty plea. After a brief explanation of the collateral consequences rule and a historical summary of relevant immigration law, Part I also describes the Supreme Court's opinion in Padilla, noting in particular the Court's consideration of deportation as a harm warranting not only a duty to avoid giving incorrect advice, but also an affirmative duty to warn. Part II presents the emerging split among lower courts regarding the impact of Padilla on the direct versus collateral distinction. Finally, in Part III, this Note assesses the continued viability of the collateral consequences rule, and the relevance of Padilla to the ineffective assistance of counsel context. This Note concludes that while the no impact courts are correct that Padilla did not eliminate the collateral consequences rule, decisions of the innovator courts suggest a better result: in light of the "unique nature of deportation" discussed in Padilla, courts should redefine the scope of direct consequences.
I. PADILLA IN CONTEXT: INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, GUILTY PLEAS, AND THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RULE
Part I begins by providing an overview of the way in which courts evaluate the validity of a guilty plea. It tracks the development of the collateral consequences rule, and the importation of that rule into the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Next, this Part surveys the immigration law landscape leading up to, and providing the foundation for, the Supreme Court's opinion in Padilla v. Kentucky. 17 Finally, this part presents the Supreme Court opinion in Padilla, and briefly traditional collateral consequence that, unlike deportation, does not stem automatically from a guilty plea. See, e.g., Ct. Apr. 13, 2012) (evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based upon failure to warn of ineligibility for citizenship). These decisions are outside the scope of this Note. The consequences at issue in those cases present an additional variable-they operate differently than deportation. In the context of civil commitment, for example, additional proceedings are warranted before a defendant is civilly committed because of his guilty plea. See, e.g., Brown, 2010 WL 1930574 , at *13 ("[Civil commitment] necessarily requires an individualized assessment of each person that might-but not must-be civilly committed upon expiration of his prison term . . . ."). Therefore, in order to isolate the Padilla effect, this Note focuses only on traditional collateral consequences stemming automatically from a guilty plea, like deportation. Furthermore, this Note is not intended to be a survey of all post-Padilla collateral consequences cases. Discussion is limited to cases that provide an insightful analysis of the Padilla decision.
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summarizes the subsequent Kentucky Court of Appeals opinion on remand. 18 A. Guilty Pleas, Due Process, and Effective Assistance of Counsel In order for a guilty plea to be valid, the defendant must enter the plea voluntarily and knowingly, 19 and the defendant must receive effective assistance of counsel when deciding whether to accept the plea. 20 This section discusses both requirements in order to demonstrate how courts imported the limiting test for a voluntary plea into the effective assistance of counsel context. Part I.A.1 explains the origins of the "voluntary and knowing" requirement, and how judicial interpretation of that requirement led to the development of the collateral consequences rule. Part I.A.2 tracks the incorporation of the collateral consequences rule into ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence.
Voluntary and Knowing: The Development of the Collateral
Consequences Rule
When a defendant pleads guilty, he does more than admit he committed the offense-he also waives his Sixth Amendment right to a trial before a judge and jury. 21 Therefore, in order for this waiver of rights to be valid under the Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court requires that the presiding judge ensure that the guilty plea is "voluntary" and "knowing." 22 In Brady v. United States, 23 the Supreme Court clarified the meaning of the "voluntariness" standard with respect to a guilty plea. 24 In Brady, the Supreme Court held that a defendant makes a voluntary, and therefore valid, guilty plea if he is "fully aware of the direct consequences" of that plea. 25 Lower courts have interpreted this language from Brady to require a judge to inform a defendant of the direct consequences of a guilty plea, but not the collateral consequences. 26 This interpretation of Brady has been termed the "collateral consequences rule." 27 While the Supreme Court has never expressly validated the rule, 28 it is widely recognized by lower courts in the context of evaluating the validity of a guilty plea. 29 Still, courts differ on how to define the distinction between direct and collateral consequences. 30 The prevailing definition of a direct consequence 31 is a consequence that is "definite, immediate, and largely automatic." 32 However, other courts distinguish direct consequences from collateral ones based on whether the particular consequence is punitive or nonpunitive in nature. 33 A third definition limits the scope of direct consequences to those that remain within the control and responsibility of the sentencing court. 34 Based on these three definitions, direct consequences typically relate to the nature of the charge and sentencing, whereas collateral consequences are usually noncriminal in nature. 35 Due to the narrow definition of direct consequences, very few are widely recognized. The most commonly accepted direct consequences are prison terms, fines, and other criminal punishments imposed by the sentencing judge. 36 If a presiding judge fails to warn a defendant of these consequences prior to the entry of a guilty plea, that plea is considered involuntary and unknowing. 37 On the other hand, typical collateral consequences include, inter alia, mandatory sex offender registration, 38 In addition to the due process requirement of a voluntary and knowing plea, a defendant must also have had the effective assistance of counsel in deciding to enter the guilty plea. 46 This requirement originated from the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 47 
a. The Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel
The Sixth Amendment's Assistance of Counsel Clause provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." 48 In a long line of cases, the Supreme Court has established that a criminal defendant's right to counsel is fundamentally important to a fair trial. 49 The Court considered this right so important that it further held that the right to counsel includes the right to effective assistance of counsel. 50 62 The Court held that "the two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel." 63 For purposes of proving ineffective assistance of counsel in the plea context, the first prong of Strickland remained identical to the standard that applied in the trial or sentencing context. 64 However, in order to satisfy the "prejudice" prong of Strickland in the plea context, defendants must "show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." 65 
c. Adoption of the Collateral Consequences Rule into the
Strickland Analysis
The Strickland standard of "reasonable professional assistance" did not provide a bright-line rule for lower courts to apply when facing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. However, lower courts needed a way to define the scope of "reasonable professional assistance" in the context of a guilty plea. 66 Therefore, these courts imported the distinction between direct and collateral consequences from the due process context. The general rule is that an attorney's performance is considered constitutionally deficient if he fails to advise a defendant of the direct consequences of entering a guilty plea. 67 70 At one extreme, the Kentucky approach, used by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Padilla, finds both collateral consequences and affirmative misadvice regarding those collateral consequences outside the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. 71 Under this approach, counsel's performance is constitutionally adequate whether he fails to advise or misadvises the defendant of collateral consequences of a proffered guilty plea.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the New Mexico approach imposes an affirmative duty of accurate advice regarding direct and some collateral consequences. 72 New Mexico courts require an attorney to accurately advise a client about a guilty plea consequence when it would be unreasonable to withhold that advice. 73 Finally, the majority approach, standing on middle ground, accepts the traditional collateral consequences rule and the affirmative misadvice exception. 74 Under this approach, counsel's performance is constitutionally adequate where he fails to advise the defendant of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea, but falls short of the constitutional standard where he provides affirmative misadvice regarding a collateral consequence. 75 The Supreme Court has never approved any version of the collateral consequences rule in the ineffective assistance of counsel context. 76 
B. The Immigration Foundations of Padilla v. Kentucky:
The Criminalization of Immigration Law The Supreme Court began its decision in Padilla with an overview of the changes in immigration law over the last ninety years. 77 The Court all about 'collateral' matters." Roberts, supra note 26, at 119. "Judicial decisions that incorporate the collateral-consequences rule and affirmative-misdavice exception deliver the following message to lawyers and judges: it is better to say nothing than take the risk of saying something wrong . concluded that "these changes . . . have dramatically raised the stakes of a noncitizen's criminal conviction." 78 This section surveys relevant changes in federal immigration law to introduce the immigration concerns underlying the Padilla decision.
Statutorily Raising the Stakes of Deportation
The first federal laws governing deportation of aliens did not appear until the late 1880s. 79 Grounds for deportation were limited under these laws, and typically included conditions existing at or prior to entry into the United States. 80 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1917 81 (1917 Act) "radically changed prior law" 82 and linked criminal law to deportation for the first time. 83 The 1917 Act, which solidified restrictive immigration policy, 84 was the first congressional act to make classes of aliens deportable based on criminal conduct committed in the United States. 85 However, the 1917 Act did not call for automatic deportation of aliens guilty of certain offenses. 86 Instead, it allowed judges the discretion to issue a judicial recommendation against deportation (JRAD), which bound the executive branch to prevent deportation. 87 Additionally, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) held that section 3 of the 1917 Act permitted relief in deportation proceedings for aliens who had departed and returned to the United States after the grounds for deportation arose. 88 In the years after the 1917 Act, Congress continued to broaden the scope of criminal offenses triggering deportation. 89 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 90 (INA) was the next major overhaul of federal immigration legislation, and is considered the "backbone of contemporary immigration law." 91 The INA consolidated prior immigration legislation 92 and further solidified the link between immigration and criminal law by again expanding the categories of criminal offenses triggering deportation. 93 The INA also eliminated the availability of JRAD discretionary relief for aliens who had committed narcotics offenses. 94 However, aliens could obtain relief through suspension of deportation, voluntary departure, adjustment of status, or stay of deportation. 95 Aliens commonly invoked these defenses as a basis for remaining in the United States. 96 Further, prior to 1996, section 212 of the INA allowed the Attorney General broad discretion to grant deportation waivers. In 1996, Congress made another significant contribution to existing immigration legislation. 98 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 99 (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 100 (IIRIRA) broadened the scope of deportable offenses 101 and narrowed the scope of judicial review 102 of deportation matters. The AEDPA and IIRIRA also curtailed the availability of deportation waivers from the Attorney General. Section 440(d) of the AEDPA identified a broad set of offenses for which convictions would make an alien ineligible for discretionary waiver relief. 103 Section 304(b) of IIRIRA repealed section 212(c) of the INA, 104 replacing it with the more narrow cancellation of removal provision. 105 
Judicial Action in the Realm of Immigration Law
The text of the U.S. Constitution does not provide Congress the power to regulate immigration. 106 It was, therefore, left to the Supreme Court to articulate such a source of power. 107 The Court first did so in 1889 with the creation of the plenary powers doctrine in the context of exclusion. 108 The plenary powers doctrine left aliens largely at the mercy of the executive and allow the Attorney General broad discretion in deportation matters as well. Congress. 109 The Supreme Court also found that inherent sovereign power existed over exclusion. 110 Therefore, the constitutional protections afforded to criminal proceedings were not available in exclusion proceedings. 111 Four years later, the Supreme Court applied the plenary powers doctrine in the context of deportation. 112 Using the same reasoning employed in the context of exclusion, the Court held that the constitutional safeguards of criminal law are not applicable to deportation proceedings. 113 The Court also characterized deportation as a civil matter for the first time. 114 This label is significant because "civil" matters do not merit the same thorough procedural review as criminal matters. 115 In 1903, however, the Court extended some protections to immigration matters, holding that an alien is entitled to due process of law in deportation proceedings. 116 Under the classic plenary powers doctrine, judicial review is narrowly circumscribed in the immigration context. 117 While certain cases prove this to be true, 118 scholars have observed that beginning in the 1940s, courts began to circumvent the classic doctrine through techniques of statutory interpretation. 119 Courts taking this approach often noted the harshness of 109. The doctrine bestows upon Congress and the executive broad and largely exclusive authority on immigration matters. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893) (asserting that the power to deport is "an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation, essential to its safety, its independence and its welfare").
110 the deportation consequence. 120 Dissenters from opinions adhering to the classic plenary powers doctrine argued that deportation really constituted a punishment. 121 These cases and the statutes discussed in the prior section demonstrate the dialogue between Congress and the Supreme Court regarding immigration law, specifically deportation. The increasing availability of deportation as a consequence for criminal activity, 122 coupled with judicial concern about the harshness of the consequences of deportation, 123 laid the foundation for the Supreme Court's decision in Padilla v. Kentucky. 124 The next section provides a discussion of the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Padilla. Padilla appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court for postconviction relief. He asserted that he would have gone to trial had his lawyer warned him of the deportation consequences of his guilty plea. 137 The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel did not protect Padilla from erroneous advice about deportation, because it was merely a collateral consequence of his conviction. 138 Thus, the Kentucky Supreme Court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing. 139 Padilla appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court granted certiorari to decide "whether, as a matter of federal law, Padilla's counsel had an obligation to advise him that the offense to which he was pleading guilty would result in his removal from this country." 140 The Supreme Court reversed Padilla's conviction in a seven-to-two vote. Justice Stevens delivered the majority opinion. Justice Alito authored a concurring opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts joined, and Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented. The next sections review each opinion. 
The Supreme Court Majority
After an exegesis on immigration law, the Court embarked on a doctrinal discussion of Padilla's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 141 The Court acknowledged the collateral consequences rule used by lower courts, including the Kentucky Supreme Court, to evaluate a Strickland claim. 142 The Court also acknowledged that removal proceedings are "civil in nature." 143 However, the Court noted that it had never applied the collateral consequences rule, and explicitly refused to do so in Padilla. 144 The Court also did not discuss whether the rule was appropriate in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 145 Instead, the Court focused on the "unique nature of deportation," which made it difficult to classify as either a direct or collateral consequence. 146 The Court pointed to several factors to support this conclusion. First, although deportation proceedings are civil in nature, deportation is a "particularly severe 'penalty'" with a nearly automatic result. 147 Further, the deportation penalty is so intimately related to the criminal conviction that it is "'difficult' to divorce the penalty from the conviction in the deportation context." 148 Finally, the Court noted the particular severity of deportation. 149 Based on these factors, the Supreme Court concluded that "advice regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Strickland applies to Padilla's claim." 150 Having determined that advice regarding the deportation consequences of a guilty plea falls within the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, the Court applied the Strickland test. The Court determined that the "weight of prevailing professional norms," along with the clarity of the immigration statute mandating deportation, 151 supports the conclusion that Padilla's counsel was constitutionally deficient in misadvising him of the deportation consequences of his guilty plea. 152 The Supreme Court therefore held that, in order to provide effective assistance of counsel, an attorney is required to advise his client of the immigration consequences of 141 
The Concurring Opinion of Justice Alito
Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, concurred in the result but wrote separately to address concerns that the majority's opinion "marks a major upheaval in Sixth Amendment law." 159 Contrary to the majority's opinion, Justice Alito would have affirmed the collateral consequences rule, 160 and limited Sixth Amendment protections to situations involving inaccurate advice. 161 Justice Alito concurred in the result because, in his view, Padilla's case fell under the affirmative misadvice exceptionPadilla's counsel erroneously advised him that he did not have to worry about deportation consequences when pleading guilty. 162 Justice Alito pointed out that to hold otherwise would be to hold contrary to every federal court of appeals that had considered the issue. 163 Still, for Justice Alito, silence alone would not be enough to satisfy a counsel's duty to provide effective assistance. 164 consequences must also be provided. 165 Specific to the immigration context, Justice Alito advocated a bright-line rule requiring a defense attorney who is aware that his client is an alien to "(1) refrain from unreasonably providing incorrect advice and (2) advise the defendant that a criminal conviction may have adverse immigration consequences and that, if the alien wants advice on this issue, the alien should consult an immigration attorney." 166 Justice Alito provided two justifications for this rule. First, immigration is a "specialized field" in which criminal defense attorneys do not have expertise and should not be doling out misinformed advice. 167 Second, by putting a client on notice that he may be subject to deportation, a defense attorney reduces the risk that a client would enter an uninformed or misinformed guilty plea. 168 The principle of stare decisis drove Justice Alito's concurrence. 169 However, the requirement of some form of notice of a potential collateral consequence, such as deportation, still does not fall squarely within one of the three commonly accepted versions of the collateral consequences rule. 170 It does, however, address concerns that the collateral consequences rule provides a perverse incentive for attorneys to remain silent on collateral consequences. 171 
Justice Scalia's Dissent
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented, accusing the majority of "swinging a sledge where a tack hammer is needed." 172 Justice Scalia would have preserved the traditional collateral consequences rule. 173 Unlike the concurrence, however, Justice Scalia would have also excluded inaccurate advice regarding collateral consequences from Sixth Amendment protections. 174 Justice Scalia joined the concurrence's adherence to the collateral consequences rule based on the principle of stare decisis, 177 and on a textual reading of the Constitution. 178 However, he departs from Justice Alito's reasoning with respect to instances of affirmative misadvice regarding a collateral consequence. 179 Instead, Justice Scalia stresses that the same floodgates issue that prompts the concurrence to advocate retaining the collateral consequences rule also warrants elimination of the affirmative misadvice exception and the notice requirement for deportation consequences. 180 Instead, Justice Scalia suggests that a statutory solution would be most appropriate. 181 He envisions legislation that "could specify which categories of misadvice about matters ancillary to the prosecution invalidate plea agreements, what collateral consequences counsel must bring to a defendant's attention, and what warnings must be given." 182
D. Justification for and Criticism of Application of the Collateral Consequences Rule to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
The varying treatment of the collateral consequences rule in the three Padilla opinions discussed above demonstrates that the state of the rule is in flux. This section presents existing criticisms of and justifications for the collateral consequences rule to frame the conflict among lower courts discussed in Part II, infra.
Borrowed from a different but related context, the collateral consequences rule has been subject to significant criticism. Critics have asserted that the rule is doctrinally flawed because, as a bright-line rule, it contradicts the Strickland mandate that ineffective assistance of counsel claims must be evaluated by an "objective standard of reasonableness." 183 Additionally, one fundamental purpose of the right to effective assistance of counsel is to ensure that a criminal defendant makes a voluntary and knowing plea under Brady. 184 One critic points out that it is difficult to understand how a plea could be fully voluntary and knowing without knowledge of the collateral consequences of that plea. 185 Similarly, other 177 . Id. at 390 ("[W]e [have never] required advice of counsel regarding consequences collateral to prosecution.").
178. Id. ("There is no basis in text or in principle to extend the constitutionally required advice regarding guilty pleas beyond those matters germane to the criminal prosecution at hand-to wit, the sentence that the plea will produce, the higher sentence that conviction after trial might entail, and the chances of such a conviction.").
179 critics note that lawyers cannot effectively advise clients, or effectively negotiate a plea bargain, without considering collateral consequences. 186 Therefore, a rule that does not require an attorney to discuss these collateral consequences with his client conflicts with that attorney's duty to advocate fiercely for his client. 187 Despite these criticisms, courts continue to adhere to the rule. The concurring and dissenting opinions in Padilla discuss several major justifications for this adherence. Justice Alito's concurring opinion in Padilla reasons that the "collateral-consequences rule expresses an important truth" that criminal defense attorneys have expertise regarding criminal proceedings, but not regarding other areas of the law. 188 Justice Alito also implicitly raises the "slippery slope" issue. He worries that abandoning the collateral consequences rule could result in attorneys having to warn their clients about every possible consequence of a conviction, which becomes unmanageable. 189 Additionally, Justice Scalia provides textual and doctrinal support for the rule in his dissenting opinion in Padilla. 190 He points out that the Sixth Amendment applies only to criminal prosecutions, and should have no application to collateral matters that are largely civil. 191 He also observes that the principle of stare decisis mandates adherence to the collateral consequences rule. 192 narrowly defined direct consequences. 194 Conversely, the "innovator" courts have begun to change their understanding of the consequences of a guilty plea based on the factors considered by the Padilla Court. These innovator courts have required defense counsel to warn defendants of consequences previously considered to be collateral, effectively broadening the scope of direct consequences. Presented with traditional collateral consequences that stem automatically from a plea or a conviction, like the deportation consequence in Padilla, the no impact courts and the innovator courts have reached different results based upon their interpretations of the Supreme Court's discussion of the collateral consequences rule and the deportation consequence in Padilla.
The next two sections discuss these interpretations, found in state court opinions after Padilla.
A. No Impact Courts Find That Padilla's Holding Is Limited to Deportation and Does Not Impact the Collateral Consequences Rule This section addresses opinions from the no impact courts that treat
Padilla as an isolated exception to the collateral consequences rule. These no impact courts have refused to interpret Padilla in a manner that upsets the traditional collateral consequences rule. 195 As a result, in these jurisdictions, an attorney still has no duty to warn of traditional collateral consequences, even those stemming automatically from a guilty plea.
No impact courts considering ineffective assistance of counsel claims based upon defense counsel's failure to warn of a traditional collateral consequence stemming automatically from a guilty plea have determined that Padilla has no impact on the direct-collateral distinction outside of the deportation context. 196 This section examines opinions by four no impact courts facing ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on the failure to warn of ineligibility to possess a firearm, 197 lifetime predatory offender registration, 198 ineligibility for parole, 199 and mandatory forfeiture of a state pension. 200 First, the factual background of each case is introduced. Then, the courts' interpretations and applications of Padilla is discussed. 
Just the Facts: The Factual Backdrop of the No Impact Cases
This section introduces the factual circumstances and procedural postures from which the no impact courts evaluated the ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Each of the four no impact cases is discussed in turn.
In Sames v. State, 201 defendant Thomas Robert Sames pled guilty to misdemeanor domestic assault under subdivision 1 of section 609.2242 of the Minnesota Statutes. 202 Pursuant to subdivision 3 of that section, a person convicted of a misdemeanor domestic assault involving a firearm automatically forfeits the right to possess that firearm. 203 Approximately one month later, after sentencing, Sames moved to withdraw his guilty plea on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds. 204 Sames argued that his counsel failed to inform him that the plea could render him ineligible to possess a firearm. 205 In his moving papers, Sames asserted that this consequence was particularly serious for him because he was an avid hunter, and he supplied much of his family's food by hunting. 206 The district court denied Sames's motion, and he appealed. 207 In Robinson v. State, 208 defendant Tony Terrell Robinson entered an Alford plea 209 to one count of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree. 210 A person convicted of that offense is automatically subject to mandatory lifetime predatory offender registration. 211 Robinson's counsel informed him of the registration requirement, but did not specify that it was a lifetime requirement. 212 After sentencing, Robinson moved to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting that it was invalid because he did not know about the lifetime registration requirement. 213 The district court denied the motion, and Robinson appealed, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer did not advise him that his plea required lifetime predatory offender registration. 214 In person convicted of that crime is subject to mandatory predatory offender registration. 217 The district court sentenced Steele to fifteen years in prison. 218 Steele filed a petition for postconviction relief. 219 He asserted ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to warn him that his plea could render him ineligible for parole. 220 The district court denied the petition, and Steele appealed. 221 Finally, in Commonwealth v. Abraham, 222 defendant Joseph Abraham, a high school teacher, pled guilty to one count of corruption of a minor and one count of indecent assault. 223 A conviction for indecent assault triggers the Public Employee Pension Forfeiture Act 224 (PEPFA). Under the Act, no public employee can receive any retirement or other benefit if he pleads guilty to a crime related to public employment. 225 Abraham filed a motion to withdraw his plea, which the trial court denied. 226 He subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer failed to inform him that he would forfeit his pension upon pleading guilty. 227 The postconviction relief court denied the petition, finding that counsel was not ineffective. 228 On appeal, the Superior Court reversed, holding that under Padilla, defense counsel was required to warn criminal defendants of "definite, immediate and automatic" consequences, such as pension forfeiture. 229 the direct-collateral consequences distinction for purposes of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The defendants in the no impact cases asserted that similarities between deportation and the collateral consequence at issue in their cases should compel the court to dispose of the collateral consequences rule, 231 create additional exceptions to it, 232 or find the consequence at issue to be a direct consequence. 233 For example, in Abraham, the defendant put forth two alternative arguments urging the court to reconsider the collateral consequences rule in light of Padilla. First, the defendant argued that "Padilla [did] not require [the c]ourt to abandon the direct versus collateral consequence analysis." 234 Instead, the defendant urged an interpretation of Padilla that "requires . . . the reviewing court [to] consider the severity of the consequences implicated by a plea, the real effect of the consequence on the defendant and the burden on counsel of providing advice as to the consequence." 235 The defendant argued that pension forfeiture under PEPFA was a particularly severe consequence and was difficult to divorce from the conviction. Defendant pointed out that under PEPFA, he was required to forfeit his "primary source of income," and that this forfeiture affected not only defendant, but also his wife, who would forfeit pension benefits "should Mr. Abraham predecease her." 236 Defendant observed that the pension forfeiture was far more severe than the criminal sanction of three years' probation. 237 Furthermore, the defendant asserted that pension forfeiture under PEPFA is "inseparable from the criminal process." 238 The defendant concluded, therefore, that like deportation in Padilla, pension forfeiture under PEPFA "does not fall readily into the traditional direct versus collateral consequence analysis." 239 Given the severity of the pension forfeiture and its intimate relationship to the criminal charge, the defendant urged the court to hold that counsel was required to warn of that consequence. 240 While the no impact courts acknowledged that, like deportation, these collateral consequences could be seen as "intimately related to the criminal process" and were perhaps "nearly an automatic result" of a guilty plea, 241 they did not consider these factors dispositive. Instead, several countervailing considerations prevailed, resulting in determinations that Padilla's holding is limited to deportation.
First, the no impact courts emphasized the Supreme Court's narrow focus on deportation in Padilla. The Supreme Court began the Padilla decision with a recitation of the history of immigration law designed to demonstrate the "unique nature of deportation." 242 The no impact courts noted that the Supreme Court explicitly declined to decide whether the direct-collateral distinction was appropriate in the ineffective assistance of counsel context. 243 Further, the no impact courts observed that the Supreme Court failed to mention the myriad of other consequences that stem automatically from a guilty plea. 244 Based on these observations, the no impact courts reasoned that only the "unique nature of deportation" justified disregarding the distinction between direct and collateral consequences. 245 Therefore, the no impact courts determined that Padilla had no relevance to the collateral consequences rule outside of the deportation context. 246 Second, no impact courts placed importance upon the precedential value of the collateral consequences rule, 247 which has traditionally been followed in some of the jurisdictions of the no impact courts. 248 Likewise, the collateral consequences at issue were traditionally considered collateral consequences in those jurisdictions. 249 The Padilla Court's narrow focus on deportation, coupled with the well-established nature of the collateral consequences rule, was not enough for the no impact courts to interpret Padilla as effecting a sea change in the realm of ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence. 250 For these courts, Padilla was simply an exception to a well-established and viable rule. Therefore, the no impact courts denied the defendants' ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on traditional collateral consequences stemming automatically from a guilty plea.
B. Innovator Courts Find That Padilla Requires Defense Attorneys To Warn of Other Traditional Collateral Consequences That Stem
Automatically from a Guilty Plea In conflict with the no impact courts, which interpreted Padilla as preserving the traditional collateral consequences rule, 251 innovator courts have construed Padilla as upsetting the traditional direct-collateral distinction in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. This section addresses decisions from innovator courts 252 that have reconsidered the definition of a direct consequence in light of the factors considered in the context of deportation in Padilla. 253 As a result, innovator courts have required defense counsel to warn their clients of certain collateral consequences that stem automatically from a guilty plea. 254 Effectively, these innovator courts have recast certain collateral consequences stemming automatically from a guilty plea as direct consequences. 255
Just the Facts: The Factual Backdrop of the Innovator Cases
This section introduces the factual circumstances and procedural postures from which the innovator courts evaluated the ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Each of the three innovator cases is discussed in turn. 257 This offense is one of the specified offenses in the Georgia sex offender statute. 258 Taylor was, therefore, subject to mandatory registration as a sex offender. 259 After sentencing, Taylor met with his probation officer, who explained the sex offender registration requirement. 260 After this initial meeting with the probation officer, Taylor filed a handwritten letter with the trial court asking to withdraw his guilty plea. 261 Taylor asserted ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to inform him of the sex offender registration requirement prior to entry of the guilty plea. 262 The trial court denied Taylor's motion to withdraw the guilty plea, invoking the collateral consequences rule. 263 The trial court found that because sex offender registry was a collateral consequence of a guilty plea, counsel was not required to advise Taylor of that consequence. 264 Taylor appealed, and the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed. 265 In People v. Fonville, 266 defendant Derek Fonville pled guilty to one count of child enticement. 267 Child enticement is a listed offense in Michigan's sex offender registry act. 268 By virtue of pleading guilty, therefore, Fonville was required to register as a sex offender. 269 At the sentencing hearing, Fonville's counsel informed the trial court that Fonville wished to withdraw his guilty plea, and Fonville stated that he wanted a jury trial. 270 Fonville asserted that he did not believe he was guilty of child enticement, and that when he entered the plea, he was unaware that he would have to register as a sex offender. 271 The trial court denied Fonville's motion to withdraw the guilty plea, and sentenced him to a term of fifty-one months to twenty years in prison. 272 After sentencing, Fonville moved once again to withdraw his guilty plea, but the trial court denied the motion. 273 275 Fonville subsequently filed a motion for relief from judgment in the trial court, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel because he was not informed of the sex offender registration requirement. 276 The trial court denied the motion, invoking the collateral consequences rule. 277 The court found that defense counsel's failure to inform Fonville of the sex offender registration requirement, a collateral consequence of the plea, did not constitute ineffective assistance. 278 Fonville appealed, and the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed. 279 In Commonwealth v. Pridham, 280 defendant Pridham pled guilty to one count of manufacturing methamphetamine (second offense), one count of complicity to commit unlawful distribution of methamphetamine, and one count of fourth-degree controlled substance endangerment to a child. 281 Under Kentucky's "violent offender" statute, convictions for these offenses automatically limit parole eligibility. 282 The trial court accepted Pridham's plea and sentenced him to thirty years in prison. 283 After sentencing, Pridham moved for relief from judgment. He asserted that defense counsel assured him that he would be eligible for parole after completing twenty percent, or six years, of his thirty-year sentence. 284 The "violent offender" statute, however, rendered Pridham ineligible for parole for twenty years. 285 Pridham argued that counsel's misadvice constituted ineffective assistance. 286 The trial court denied Pridham's motion based on the collateral consequences rule. 287 Because parole eligibility was a collateral consequence, the court held that counsel's misadvice regarding that consequence did not rise to the level of ineffective assistance. 288 This part surveys the defendants' arguments in the innovator cases. It also sets out the courts' responses to those arguments and the reasoning by which the courts concluded that Padilla required a change in the traditional direct-collateral consequences distinction for purposes of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Each innovator court discussed above is located in a jurisdiction that subscribed to the collateral consequences rule prior to Padilla. 294 The consequences at issue in each case were traditionally considered collateral consequences, 295 but were also automatically triggered by a guilty plea. 296 The defendants in these cases asserted that these traditional collateral consequences they faced as a result of pleading guilty should be considered direct consequences in light of Padilla. 297 One court explicitly agreed with the defendants, 298 and two courts' holdings implicitly affirmed the defendants' arguments. 299 Several considerations drove these courts to determine that Padilla's holding requires certain collateral consequences stemming automatically from a guilty plea to be termed direct. 300 One court noted that deportation had been historically considered a collateral consequence in its jurisdiction. 301 Since Padilla abrogated that characterization and refused to employ the collateral consequences rule at all, 302 these courts reasoned that Padilla also cast doubt on existing direct-collateral characterizations of other consequences. 303 Therefore, these courts felt it was necessary to reassess those consequences in light of Padilla.
In contrast with the no impact courts, 304 the innovator courts did not interpret Padilla as focusing narrowly on deportation. Instead, these courts found that Padilla changed the inquiry about what constitutes a direct consequence for the purposes of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 305 Innovator courts used several factors articulated by the Supreme Court in Padilla 306 to reshape the definition of a direct consequence: prevailing professional norms, 307 the severity of the consequence, 308 whether the consequence is "intimately related to the criminal process," 309 and whether the consequence is "nearly an automatic result" of the conviction or plea. 310 Abandoning the traditional definition of a direct consequence of a guilty plea, these courts determined that the Padilla factors now controlled the scope of direct consequences of a guilty plea. 311 Using these factors, the innovator courts determined that mandatory sex offender registration and ineligibility for parole qualified as direct consequences of a guilty plea. 312 One court noted that these determinations ran contrary to prior case law. 313 However, the innovator courts found their conclusions necessary in light of the newly articulated ineffective assistance of counsel inquiry and standard in Padilla. 314 III. RESHAPING THE DEFINITION OF DIRECT CONSEQUENCES IN LIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN PADILLA V. KENTUCKY This Part first assesses the viability of the collateral consequences rule for purposes of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and finds that the rule should be preserved because it serves a valid purpose. Next, this Part considers the immigration motivations for the Padilla Court's decision, and finds that, despite the "unique" nature of deportation, courts should employ the Padilla advisory to redefine the scope of direct consequences for purposes of ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence. 315 This Note concludes that lower courts should preserve the collateral consequences rule but abolish the current bright-line definition of direct consequences in light of the Supreme Court's discussion of deportation in Padilla.
A. The Collateral Consequences Rule Serves an Important Purpose
The collateral consequences rule was not created for use in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 316 Nevertheless, almost every lower court in the United States uses the rule. 317 Therefore, the relevant question to ask is whether the collateral consequences rule serves a valid purpose in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence. Despite scathing criticism of the rule, 318 the prudent discussions of the rule in Padilla in Justice Alito's concurrence and Justice Scalia's dissent, 319 and other practical considerations, suggest that the rule does serve a valid purpose.
Padilla the collateral consequences rule must yield in those cases where a defendant's guilty plea was induced by his attorney's misadvice concerning a collateral consequence of the plea sufficiently punitive, grave, and enmeshed with the plea's direct consequences . . . ."); Fonville, 804 N.W.2d at 894-95 ("[A]pplying the Padilla rationale to this case supports a holding that defense counsel must advise a defendant that registration as a sexual offender is a consequence of the defendant's guilty plea.").
313. See, e.g., Fonville, 804 N.W.2d at 893 n.60 ("A direct consequence must affect the range of punishment in a definite, immediate, and largely automatic way. The registration requirement has absolutely no effect on the range of the defendant's punishment for the crime . As Justice Alito shrewdly observed, in the absence of the collateral consequences rule, attorneys may be obligated to warn clients about each and every possible potential consequence of a guilty plea. 320 This scenario is unworkable from the standpoint of criminal defense attorneys, judges, and general practicality.
Criminal defense attorneys are, by definition, experts at navigating criminal proceedings 321 -guilty pleas included. However, these attorneys do not possess that same level of expertise for other areas of the law, 322 which may relate to collateral consequences of the criminal proceeding. It is unrealistic to expect criminal defense attorneys to quickly become experts in these areas in order to anticipate a vast array of potential consequences of a guilty plea for each client. 323 The collateral consequences rule is an important benchmark upon which attorneys can rely in order to ensure that they are providing effective assistance of counsel.
From a judicial perspective, eliminating the collateral consequences rule would disrupt years of ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence. 324 Courts would no longer have a reliable benchmark upon which to evaluate an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland. This raises judicial consistency and reliance concerns, although for different reasons than those articulated by Justice Scalia. 325 However, an even more pressing concern exists. Without the collateral consequences rule, judges have a higher level of discretion over which consequences a defense attorney must warn his client about. Different judges in the same jurisdiction may have differing views on what constitutes effective assistance, resulting in unpredictable ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence. Further, eliminating the collateral consequences rule would open the door to a myriad of new foundations for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. If some of these claims are put forth in bad faith, or in an attempt to withdraw a guilty plea after a change of heart, judicial economy suffers. of a guilty plea. 328 However, this does not mean that Padilla cannot have any implications for the collateral consequences rule in the broader context of ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence. Padilla raises an important point: while certain consequences of a guilty plea may have appeared quite distinct from the criminal conviction in the past, they are now so intimately linked that a rethinking of the definition of direct consequences is in order. 329 Therefore, courts should interpret Padilla as requiring that defense counsel advise criminal defendants of other traditional collateral consequences stemming automatically from a guilty plea. 330
B. While Deportation
1. Deportation Really Is "Different"
In Padilla, the Supreme Court cited no precedent for its decision to require defense counsel to warn criminal defendants of the deportation consequences of a guilty plea. 331 Instead, the Court referenced the "severity" of the deportation consequence for noncitizens like Jose Padilla. 332 The Court proceeded to hold that Padilla's counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to warn Padilla that pleading guilty would result in his deportation. 333 This rhetoric, and the subsequent holding, harkens back to earlier immigration cases that cited similar concerns. 334 Padilla is best situated in the context of these immigration cases, continuing a Supreme Court trend of affording additional (and in this case, constitutional) rights to aliens. 335 Deportation is a high-stakes consequence for noncitizens. 336 Although certain other consequences of a criminal conviction can change the life of a defendant, none do so as drastically as automatic forcible removal from the country in which one resides. 337 In recognition of this fact, the neat categorization of deportation as "civil" is slowly eroding. 338 Over the past century, and especially over the past twenty years, immigration and criminal law have become enmeshed in an unprecedented way. 339 Commentators have suggested that immigration no longer falls squarely into the civil or criminal category. 340 It appears that the Supreme Court has recognized this change in Padilla. While employing the traditional "civil" label to describe deportation, the what truly drives the distinction. 351 As some of the post-Padilla cases have demonstrated, consequences triggered automatically upon entry of a guilty plea or upon conviction, such as sex offender registration or forfeiture of a state pension, have nevertheless been considered collateral because they are civil, not criminal, in nature. 352 However, the fact that a consequence is civil does not mean that it cannot have severe and debilitating effects on a defendant. 353 Not requiring defense counsel to advise criminal defendants of collateral (in essence, civil) consequences of a guilty plea as a categorical matter draws an arbitrary and unfair line for viable ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 354 Instead, courts should employ a more functional definition of direct consequences. This definition would incorporate analysis from Strickland, the doctrinal foundation of ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence, 355 and the Padilla factors that the Supreme Court considered when exempting deportation from the traditional rule. 356 Strickland mandates a case-by-case approach to ineffective assistance of counsel claims, rejecting application of a bright-line rule. 357 However, in the absence of any sort of rule, courts would have no baseline with which to evaluate an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Therefore, while adhering to the collateral consequences rule, courts should adopt a case-bycase determination of what constitutes a direct consequence for each particular defendant. In doing so, courts should consider the factors focused on by the Padilla Court: the severity of the consequence for the particular defendant, whether the consequence results automatically from the conviction, and whether the consequence is so closely related to the conviction that it is difficult to separate the two. 358 While criminal defense attorneys are certainly experts at navigating criminal proceedings, 359 they are also experts in another area-their clients. Therefore, although it may be unrealistic to expect criminal defense attorneys to become versed in any area of the law which may be implicated by a particular guilty plea, it is not overly burdensome to require attorneys to understand which potential consequences may be most important to their 351 clients, and to advise their clients accordingly. This formulation of the rule avoids any potential "perverse incentives" for a defense attorney to decline to provide advice about "collateral consequences," such as those involved with the affirmative misadvice exception employed by some lower courts. 360 In fact, it creates positive incentives for criminal defense attorneys to ensure that their clients are informed of the potential consequences most important to them. Padilla's holding should prompt lower courts to reconsider the definition of direct consequences when applying the collateral consequences rule. 361 The factors considered by the Supreme Court in Padilla provide an excellent foundation upon which to redefine the scope of "direct consequences" of a guilty plea. 362 This remains true even though the Court's motivations stemmed primarily from concerns regarding immigration law. 363 
CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court held in Padilla v. Kentucky 364 that a defense counsel must advise his client of the potential deportation consequences of a guilty plea. 365 In so holding, the Court refused to validate the collateral consequences rule for the purposes of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 366 Instead, the Court focused on the unique qualities of deportation, a traditional collateral consequence, that make it an exception to that rule. 367 Despite this Supreme Court decision, the collateral consequences rule has important application in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. For practical and policy reasons, lower courts should not interpret Padilla as eradicating the collateral consequences rule. 368 However, given the criteria invoked in the Supreme Court's analysis of the deportation consequence in Padilla, and the Strickland mandate that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, lower courts should redefine "direct consequence" for the purposes of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim so that other traditional collateral consequences that stem automatically from a guilty plea may properly be considered direct. 369 Courts should employ the factors considered by the Supreme Court in Padilla, determining which consequences of a guilty plea are particularly severe for an individual defendant and labeling all other consequences collateral. This creates proper incentives for attorneys to 360 
